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Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Harris v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Alabama capital sentencing scheme.1
Chief among the provisions of the sentencing scheme is that the jury
issues an advisory sentence which the sentencing judge must consider
in imposing a sentence. Although the provision does not specify the
weight a judge must give to the jury's advisory verdict,2 the majority
concluded that this provision does not violate the Eighth Amendment
since it does not result in arbitrary or capricious sentences.
3
This Note concludes that, contrary to the majority's assertions,
Alabama's scheme violates the Eighth Amendment since it results in
arbitrary and capricious sentences. This Note examines Alabama's
scheme in light of (1) statements made by the Court in earlier death
penalty cases regarding the constitutional requirements imposed by
the Eighth Amendment, (2) sentencing processes in general, and (3)
the consequences of Alabama's scheme. This Note argues that the
standards imposed by the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by the
Court mandate a scheme that provides more guidance to the sen-
tencer than the Alabama scheme. This necessity, recognized in previ-
ous holdings and statements in dicta issued by the Court, is evident
given the fact that a certain amount of arbitrariness already exists in
any sentencing procedure as a result of the incalculable number of
outside factors that can effect a judge's sentence. This Note further
maintains that an examination of the differing standards employed by
the Alabama trial court judges in their sentencing opinions is direct
evidence of the arbitrary results of the Alabama sentencing scheme.
Although the Court is not responsible for providing this guidance, the
1 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995).
2 Id. at 1032-33.
3 Id. at 1036.
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Court must serve as a watchdog to ensure that the individual states do
provide it. Finally, this Note argues that the majority opinion avoided
a thorough examination of precedent and of the realities of sentenc-
ing in Alabama by simply concluding that the Court does not have the
power to legislate.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE ALABAMA SENTENCING SCHEME IN CAPITAL MURDER CASES
The Alabama capital sentencing scheme is set forth in the Ala-
bama Code.4 The Code provides that defendants convicted of capital
murder are entitled to a sentencing hearing before the trial jury.5 At
the sentencing hearing, the state must disprove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, any mitigating factors proffered by the defendant,
and the state must prove any statutory aggravating factors beyond a
reasonable doubt.6 Thejury then evaluates the evidence. If ten of the
twelve jurors agree that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances, the jury recommends a death sentence;
otherwise, the jury recommends life imprisonment with no possibility
of parole.
7
The jury's recommended sentence and the jury's vote tally is then
reported to the judge,8 whereupon the judge is required to "consider"
the jury's advisory sentence along with all of the evidence available. 9
The judge must then issue a written sentence which describes the de-
fendant's crime and details the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances.10 Finally, the judge must impose a sentence. 1I The statute
also provides for a mandatory appellate process if the defendant is
sentenced to death. 1
2
4 See ALA. CODE § 1A-5-46 (1994).
5 Id. In fact, in order for the jury to be excluded from participation in the sentencing
process each party must agree to waive its participation, and the court must approve the
waiver. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-44 (1994).
6 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(g) (1994).
7 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e), (f).
8 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct 1031, 1033 (1995).
9 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994).
10 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(d) (1994).
11 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e).
12 If the judge sentences the defendant to death, there is an automatic review process
whereby the defendant's conviction and sentence are automatically reviewed by an appel-
late court. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b) (1994). If the appellate court affirms the trial court's
conviction and sentence, as a matter of right the Alabama Supreme Court grants a writ of
certiorari. Id. The appellate courts are required, in addition to reviewing the record for
errors, to independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to deter-
mine whether the death penalty in the case at hand is disproportionate to the punishments
meted out in similar cases. Id.
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AND THE DEATH PENALTY
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution protects against
cruel and unusual punishment. 13 This Eighth Amendment protec-
tion has been held applicable to the states by its incorporation into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14 The
Supreme Court, in setting forth the goals of the Eighth Amendment,
has stated that the "primary principle is that a punishment must not
be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings."' 5
The Eighth Amendment, prior to 1972, was never successfully
used to challenge a capital punishment statute. 16 In fact, the Eighth
Amendment frequently was not even mentioned in the Court's opin-
ions in death penalty cases before 1972.17 During this time, therefore,
the states enacted and implemented their death penalty schemes with
no guidance or control from the federal government.'8
In 1972, however, the Court expanded the scope of the Eighth
Amendment in Furman v. Georgia19 when it applied the Eighth
Amendment in a constitutional challenge to state capital punishment
schemes. Since then, the Court has consistently used the Eighth
Amendment, with its prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ments, and the standards developed by the Court in Furman v. Georgia
to evaluate capital sentencing schemes.20 In Furman, three cases were
reviewed by the Court simultaneously.21 In each of the cases the de-
fendant had been sentenced to death.2 2 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari so it could determine whether the sentencing schemes
under which the defendants were sentenced to death were constitu-
tional.23 The Court held that a death sentence may not be imposed
where the sentencing procedures in place create a substantial risk that
the punishments will be inflicted arbitrarily and capriciously.2 4 The
13 U.S. CONSr. amend. VIII. The full text of the Eighth Amendment reads: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."
14 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 287 n.8 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, jJ.).
15 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
16 Stephen R. McAllister, The Problem of Implementing a Constitutional System of Capital
Punishment, 43 KA. L. Rv. 1039, 1044 (1995).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
20 For a more in-depth look at the Court's treatment of the death penalty throughout
history, see Hugo A. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America: Yesterday and Today, 95 Dic- L.
REv. 759 (1991).
21 Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
22.Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
23 Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). But see Scott W. Howe, The Constitution and Capi-
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Court deemed that such arbitrariness violated the constitutional pro-
tection against cruel and unusual punishment.25 As a result of the
Furman decision, all existing death penalty statutes were declared un-
constitutional by the Court26 since the statutes were being selectively
applied.
27
Following the Furman decision, states revised their capital sen-
tencing schemes. 28 Various defendants challenged these revised sen-
tencing schemes, arguing that they were unconstitutional under the
new mandates set forth in Furman.29 Importantly, in Proffitt v. Flor-
ida,30 the Supreme Court declared that the death penalty is not per se
cruel and unusual punishment.
3 1
For instance, in Gregg v. Georgia, the defendant was convicted of
two counts of murder and two counts of armed robbery,3 2 and was
sentenced to death by the jury.3 3 This sentence was upheld by the
Georgia Supreme Court.3 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to determine the constitutionality of the Georgia capital sen-
tencing scheme. 35 The Court stated, "[W] here discretion is afforded
a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of
whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must
be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action."36
In Woodson v. North Carolina,3 7 the Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of the North Carolina capital sentencing scheme. The de-
fendants in Woodson were found guilty of murder and armed robbery
and were sentenced to death by the jury, as was required by state stat-
ute.- 8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine
tal Sentencing: PursuingJustice and Equality, 60 FORDHAM L. Ray'. 749 (1992) (stating that
mandates of Furman are unclear).
25 Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
26 Id. at 239-40.
27 Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
28 Thirty-five states enacted new capital sentencing schemes in the four years following
the Furman decision. Katheryn K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury Override in Alabama
Death Penalty Cases, 46 ALA. L. REv. 5, 7 (1994).
29 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 287
n.8 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J1.); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976).
30 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
31 Id. at 247.
32 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 160.
33 Id. at 161.
34 Id. at 161-62.
-35 Id. at 162.
36 Id. at 189.
37 428 U.S. 280 (1978).
38 Id. at 284. The North Carolina statute under which the defendants were sentenced
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whether a sentencing scheme which mandated the death penalty for a
broad category of offenses-first degree murders, generally-consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment.3 9 Reasoning that the scheme
failed to take individual defendants and their individual circum-
stances into account and determining that there is a "need for reliabil-
ity in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case," the Court concluded that the North Carolina sentenc-
ing scheme violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.40
Moreover, the Court stated that there was no way for the North Caro-
lina sentencing scheme to keep a check on the arbitrary impositions
of sentences.
4 '
The Supreme Court, in Gregg, Woodson, and the other cases ad-
dressing the constitutionality of the states' new sentencing schemes,
continued to demand that states meet the standards the Court had
put forth in Furman. That is, the Court required that the sentencing
schemes, regardless of their specific provisions, not result in arbitrary
and capricious sentences. 42
C. STATE SENTENCING SCHEMES
Four states, Alabama, 43 Florida,44 Indiana,45 and Delaware,4 have
developed capital sentencing systems whereby the jury issues an advi-
sory sentence, but the judge imposes the final sentence and, in doing
so, can override the jury's advisory sentence.47 The Supreme Court
first analyzed the constitutionality of such sentencing systems under
Florida's sentencing statute. 48 The specific provisions of the Florida
to death provided, in part, "A murder which shall be... committed in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony, shall
be deemed murder in the first degree and shall be punishable by death." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
39 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 287.
40 Id. at 305.
41 Id. at 303.
42 As demonstrated by Gregg and Woodson, the Court upheld some capital sentencing
statutes and rejected others. See also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality
opinion) and Woodson, 428 U.S. 280 (plurality opinion). The Court found that the
schemes adopted in both of these states violated the Eighth Amendment because they
mandated the death penalty for defendants convicted of certain crimes. Russell, supra
note 28, at 9. For a complete discussion of the new sentencing schemes, see Russell, supra
note 28, at 9-10.
43ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e).
44 F"A. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.141(2)-(3) (Harrison 1991 & Supp. 1993).
45 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (West Supp. 1994).
46 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (Supp. 1992).
47 This is different than all of the other states' capital sentencing schemes where either
the judge or the jury makes the entire sentencing decision. See § V.B. infra.
48 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
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capital sentencing scheme are similar to those in Alabama's scheme,
but in Florida, further restrictions were placed on sentencing judges
by the Florida Supreme Court49 in Tedder v. State.50 In Tedder, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court held that "in order to sustain a sentence of death
following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sen-
tence of death should be so clear and convincing that no reasonable
person could differ."51 The Tedder court further provided that the
sentencing judge must accord "great weight" to the jury's recommen-
dation.52 In Proffitt v. Florida,53 the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Florida sentencing scheme. 54 The Supreme Court
concluded that given the combination of the statutory provisions by
the Florida Code and the common law provisions provided by Tedder,
Florida's capital sentencing scheme did not result in arbitrary and ca-
pricious sentences and therefore was constitutional. 55
In subsequent cases readdressing the constitutionality of the Flor-
ida sentencing scheme, the Supreme Court continued to uphold and
praise what has become known as the Tedder standard.56 For example,
in Parker v. Dugger,57 the Court stated, "We have held specifically that
the Florida Supreme Court's system of independent review of death
sentences minimizes the risk of constitutional error, and have noted
the 'crucial protection' afforded by such review in jury override
cases."58 In Spaziano v. Florida,59 the Court declared that Florida could
allow the jury to play an advisory role in sentencing, vesting sentenc-
ing authority in the judge.60 The Court reasoned that the "Eighth
Amendment is not violated every time a state reaches a conclusion
different from a majority of its sisters over how best to administer its
criminal laws."'61 Moreover, the Court stated:
[t]his Court already has recognized the significant safeguard the Tedder
standard affords a capital defendant in Florida.... We are satisfied that
the Florida Supreme Court takes the standard seriously and has not hesi-
tated to reverse a trial court if it derogates the jury's role.
62
49 Id. at 248-51.
50 322 So. 2d 908 (1975).
51 Id. at 910.
52 Id.
53 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
54 Id. at 259-60.
55 Id.
56 See, e.g., Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 311 (1991); Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct.
1031, 1034-35 (1995).
57 498 U.S. 308 (1991).
58 Id. at 321.
59 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
60 Id. at 464.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 465.
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In declaring the constitutionality of the Florida sentencing scheme,
the Court continually noted that Tedder provides the requisite consti-
tutional protections against arbitrary and capricious sentences; the
Court never declared that such protections are obtained through the
statutory scheme alone.6
3
Both Delaware64 and Indiana6 5 have common law restrictions on
judicial powers in sentencing which are similar to Florida's Tedder
standard. The constitutionality of the Delaware and Indiana capital
sentencing schemes and their implementation has not yet been ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court.
66
The majority of the states with capital sentencing schemes vest
complete sentencing authority in the jury.67 Four states, however,
have capital sentencing schemes whereby the judge makes the entire
sentencing decision. 68 The Supreme Court has upheld the constitu-
tionality of these schemes each time the Court addressed them, not-
ing that the schemes provide sufficient guidance to the judges.
69
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 1988,70 Louise Harris, an African-American woman,
6- See id. at 465-66.
64 See Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368, 1377-78 (Del. 1992). Here, the defendant was
sentenced to death after being convicted on two separate charges of murder. Id. at 1369.
The defendant waived his right to have ajury recommend a sentence. Id. at 1373. The
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence, stating that the Tedder analysis was
"didactic... for present purposes," id. at 1377, and the court, invoking the Tedderstandard,
concluded that the facts in the present case led to the conclusion that no reasonable per-
son could differ that death was the proper sentence to impose on the defendant. Id. at
1378.
65 See Martinez-Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind. 1989). Here, the defendant
was found guilty of murder and of felony murder and was sentenced to death. Id. at 732.
The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the death sentence invoking the Tedderstandard and
stating, "In order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life,
the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no
reasonable person could differ." Id. at 734.
66 Russell, supra note 28, at 42.
67 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1037-38 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
infra note 160 and accompanying text.
68 Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska have capital sentencing schemes which vest
complete capital sentencing power in thejudge. SeeAruz. RE%'. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (Supp.
1993); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-103 - 301 (1993); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (1993).
69 Addressing the Arizona capital sentencing scheme in a motion denying a rehearing
of a motion for certiorari, the Court stated that jury input is not required in sentencing.
Richmond v. Arizona, 434 U.S. 1323 (1977). The Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Idaho capital sentencing scheme on other grounds. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534
(1993). The Court has not addressed the constitutionality of the Montana or the Nebraska
capital sentencing schemes.
70 Petitioner's Brief at 9, Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995) (No. 93-7659).
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hired someone to kill her husband,7 1 Isaiah.72 Harris contracted to
have him killed with the help of Lorenzo McCarter, the man with
whom she was having an affair. 73 McCarter enlisted two of his friends,
Michael Sockwell and Alex Hood, to commit the crime. 74 McCarter
paid Sockwell and Hood $100 to kill Isaiah, and he promised to pay
them more money upon completion of the crime. 75 Pursuant to the
contract, Sockwell and Hood shot and killed Isaiah.
7 6
Shortly after 11:00 p.m. on the night of the murder, Harris paged
McCarter on his beeper to alert him that Isaiah had just left their
house.7 7 At this time, McCarter was across the street from Harris's
home, seated in Hood's car, and Sockwell was hidden behind a bush
next to a stop sign near the house. 78 Isaiah drove down the street,
headed for work.79 As Isaiah stopped at the intersection, Sockwell
jumped out from behind the bush and shot him at point blank range
with a shotgun.8 0
When Isaiah failed to arrive at work, a co-worker telephoned Har-
ris to inquire about her husband.8 a Harris offered no assistance to the
caller.8 2 Shortly after midnight, two men discovered Isaiah's body and
telephoned the police.8 3 The police went to Harris's house to notify
her of her husband's death.8 4 Harris screamed and sobbed upon
hearing the news.8 5 The police testified, however, that Harris did not
cry and that she immediately grew calm when the police asked her
questions.8 6
During police questioning, Harris revealed that she and her hus-
band had been experiencing marital problems and that she was hav-
ing an affair with McCarter.8 7 When asked if McCarter could have
killed her husband, Harris responded that she did not know, but if he
had, she had not told him to do so. 88 Harris also revealed that she was
71 Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d 503, 508 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
72 Respondent's Brief at 57, Harris (No. 93-7659).







80 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1033 (1995).
81 Harris, 632 So. 2d at 508.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 508-09.







the beneficiary of several insurance policies that had been taken out
on her husband's life.89 The police arrested Harris after question-
ing.90 McCarter agreed to testify against Harris in exchange for the
prosecutor's promise not to seek the death penalty against him.9'
A jury convicted Harris of capital murder.92 At the sentencing
hearing before the trial court, several witnesses testified about Harris's
good character and background.9 3 They stated that she was raising
seven children, held three jobs simultaneously, and participated ac-
tively in her church.94 As a result, the jury recommended that Harris
be sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole, in-
stead of being sentenced to death.95 Of the twelve jurors, seven voted
for life without parole and five voted for death by electrocution.
96
Upon receiving the jury's recommendation, the trial judge con-
sidered Harris's sentence and found one aggravating circumstance
and two mitigating circumstances. 97 Thejudge found the fact that the
murder was committed for pecuniary gain to be an aggravating cir-
cumstance. 98 The judge found the fact that Harris did not have a
criminal record to be a statutory mitigating factor and determined
that her upstanding character as a hardworking churchgoer was a
non-statutory mitigating factor.99 Determining that the aggravating
factor outweighed the mitigating factors, the trial judge rejected the
jury's recommendation and sentenced Harris to death. 00
Harris appealed her sentence, contending that the Alabama capi-
tal sentencing scheme was unconstitutional since it failed to give
proper guidance regarding the amount of weight to accord the jury's
recommended sentence to the sentencing judge.' 0 ' The Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Harris's conviction and sentence,
noting that Alabama's death penalty statute is based on Florida's sen-
tencing scheme, a scheme which has been held constitutional by the
United States Supreme Court.'0 2 The Alabama Supreme Court af-
firmed, rejecting Harris's contention that a judge must give great
89 Id.











101 Petitioner's Brief at 10, Harris (No. 93-7659).
102 Haris, 632 So. 2d at 540.
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weight to the jury's recommended sentence. 03
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether Alabama law, which vests ultimate sentencing power in
the trial judge but requires the judge to consider ajury's advisory sen-
tence, violates the Eighth Amendment by failing to specify the weight
the judge must accord the jury's recommendation.
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion'0 4 which af-
firmed the decisions of the Supreme Court of Alabama, the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Alabama, and the trial court.'0 5 The Supreme
Court held that Alabama's sentencing scheme does not violate the
Eighth Amendment even though it does not specify how much weight
a sentencing judge must accord ajury's advisory sentencing verdict.10 6
Although the Court previously upheld the constitutionality of the
Florida sentencing scheme, which specifies the weight a judge must
accord a jury's advisory sentence, Justice O'Connor stated that such a
scheme is not constitutionally mandated.10 7 Rather, the Court held
that Alabama's scheme, which only requires that a sentencing judge
"consider" a jury's advisory sentence without specifying the precise
weight the judge must accord it, was constitutional.
10 8
The Court's opinion began with a comparison of Alabama's and
Florida's sentencing procedures.' 0 9 In both Alabama and Florida the
reviewing courts must weigh the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances in order to determine the appropriateness of the death pen-
alty. 110 Additionally, the courts must decide whether, in light of the
circumstances, the death penalty is excessive."'
The majority recognized, however, that although both states re-
quire the jury's participation in the sentencing process, the two
schemes differ. 112 In Florida, as provided by the Florida Supreme
Court, the sentencing judge must accord "great weight""13 to the
103 Ex Parte Harris, 632 So. 2d 543, 544 (Ala. 1993).
104 ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's opinion.
105 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1033-34 (1995).
106 Id. at 1036.
107 Id. at 1035.
108 Id. at 1036.




113 This standard has been referred to as the "Tedder standard." See id.
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jury's advisory sentence and not overrule it unless "the facts suggesting
a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no
reasonable person could differ."1 14 This, however, is not the case in
Alabama.115 Justice O'Connor noted that the Alabama sentencing
statute only requires the sentencing judge to "consider" the jury's rec-
ommendation and further observed that the Alabama courts have not
read any further requirements into the statute.116
Justice O'Connor proceeded to discuss past Supreme Court cases
which reviewed the Florida sentencing scheme.117 She began by not-
ing the Court's decision in Spaziano v. Rorida,118 which declared Flor-
ida's sentencing procedure to be constitutional. 119 In Spaziano, the
Court concluded that a jury could play an advisory role in sentenc-
ing.120 Justice O'Connor agreed with the proposition set forth in
Spaziano that it is constitutional for ajudge, rather than ajury, to sen-
tence a criminal to death.' 21
Next, Justice O'Connor discussed the Court's favorable impres-
sions of the Florida sentencing scheme.'2 2 For instance, the Court in
Dobbert v. Forida125 lauded the "crucial protection" provided by the
Tedder standard. 24 However, Justice O'Connor noted, the fact that
the Court approved of and appreciated the Tedder standard did not
mean that the Tedderstandard was a constitutional imperative. 125 The
amount of weight a judge accords a jury's verdict is less important
than "whether the scheme adequately channels the sentencer's discre-
tion so as to prevent arbitrary results."126
The Court then determined that the Constitution does not re-
quire that any specific weight be accorded to particular factors, in-
cluding both aggravating and mitigating factors. 127 Following this line
of reasoning, Justice O'Connor concluded that "the Eighth Amend-
ment does not require the State to define the weight the sentencing
judge'must accord to an advisory jury verdict.'
28
114 Id. at 1034 (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d at 910).
115 Id.
116 Id.
"7 Id. at 1033-37.
118 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
119 Hartis, 115 S. Ct. at 1034.
120 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464.
121 Hais, 115 S. Ct. at 1034 (citing Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 465).
122 Id. at 1035.
123 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
124 Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1035 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977)).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. (citing Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990)).
128 Id. at 1036.
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Justice O'Connor next discussed the number of advisory jury ver-
dicts that judges have overruled in Alabama, 29 noting that judges
override recommendations of life imprisonment much more often
than recommendations of the death penalty.130 Justice O'Connor
cautioned that the statistics are not indicative of the statute's constitu-
tionality. 31 Rather, the statistics might reflect the fact that the statute
does not achieve the effect that its enactors desired.13 2 That is, per-
haps the Alabama sentencing scheme results in more defendants be-
ing sentenced to death than the legislature had intended when it
enacted the sentencing scheme.' 33 If that is the case, Justice
O'Connor noted, the legislature should amend the sentencing
scheme; the Court should not declare it unconstitutional.
3 4
The majority rejected the proposition put forth in Justice Ste-
vens's dissent' 35 that the jury's verdict must be accorded great weight
because it best reflects community standards.' 3 6 Justice O'Connor
reasoned that it is not the Court's role to determine how a state can
best mete out punishments. 37 The Court has no jurisdiction over
those matters to the extent that they involve only policy issues.' 38 The
only power the Court does have is to determine whether legislation
comports with the Constitution. 39 Thus, Justice O'Connor con-
cluded, the Court's only role in Harris was to determine the constitu-
tionality of the Alabama sentencing scheme, and not to legislate by re-
writing the Alabama scheme. 140
The majority also rejected the arguments put forth by Petitioner
Harris regarding the roles of the judge and the jury in the Alabama
sentencing scheme. 141 Harris maintained that the jury's role in Ala-
bama was more than advisory and that the jury, not the judge, held
the key sentencing role.' 42 Harris reasoned that there would be no
need for sentence reversal where the jury was exposed to prejudicial







135 Id. at 1039 (Stevens, J., dissenting).










inferred, from the fact that such reversals have occurred, that the jury
must play the key role.144 Justice O'Connor pointed out the flaw in
this reasoning, noting that reversal in such a case is proper regardless
of whether the jury's verdict played a key role or a determinative
role.145
Continuing her analysis, Justice O'Connor rejected Harris's argu-
ment thatjudges' differing treatments ofjuries' recommendations led
to arbitrariness and capriciousness. 146 Justice O'Connor reasoned
that the differing treatment of the juries' advisory sentences in Ala-
bama merely reflected the different circumstances of the cases. 147 Jus-
tice O'Connor maintained that the "sentiments expressed in
unrelated cases do not render Petitioner Harris's punishment viola-
tive of the Eighth Amendment" and that the cases cited by Harris in
which judges accorded different weights to the jury's recommenda-
tions were unrelated. 148 Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded that
the Alabama sentencing scheme was constitutional.
1 49
B. JUSTICE STEVENS'S DISSENT
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that Alabama's
sentencing scheme violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments because it failed to guide sentencing judges in their treatment
of jury verdicts.15 0 To support his position, Justice Stevens discussed
the role of the jury, stating that the jury verdict is supposed to embody
the voice of the community.151 He, therefore, concluded that this
community voice should guide the ultimate decision of whether the
citizen whom the jury has found guilty should be sentenced to
death.'5 2 Justice Stevens reasoned that the death penalty is different
than any other punishment because its only goal is retribution-and
retribution is something the community should determine.
53
Justice Stevens cited the potential for the Alabama sentencing
scheme to subject criminals to double jeopardy as another indication
of the scheme's unconstitutionality. 154 By subjecting the defendant to
the jury's advisory sentence and then to the sentencing judge's sen-
144 Id.
145 Id.




150 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 1040 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tence, Justice Stevens argued, the Alabama scheme effectively places
the criminal's life in jeopardy twice and, therefore, should be declared
unconstitutional.
55
Justice Stevens next discussed the problems with vesting too
much authority in the sentencing judge. He pointed out that trial
judges in Alabama face election every six years and thus might suc-
cumb to political pressures in making their decisions. 56 As a result,
Justice Stevens argued, there are differences between the ways in
which judges and juries impose sentences. 157 Such differences are ap-
parent in the fact that Alabama judges have overridden only five
death sentences in favor of sentencing the defendant to life imprison-
ment, but these same judges have "condemned [forty-seven] defend-
ants whom juries would have spared." 58 As a result, Justice Stevens
argued, the proper sentencing scheme is one in which the judge does
not have a role.1 59 To support this contention, Justice Stevens noted
that throughout its history, the Court has recognized the importance
of the jury's role in sentencing.1 60 Thejury, composed of members of
the community, should be the body responsible for meting out the
ultimate sentencing judgment of one of its members.' 6 ' Justice Ste-
vens stated: "Death sentences imposed by judges over contrary jury
verdicts do more than countermand the community's judgment: they
express contempt for that judgment."
62
Justice Stevens claimed that Florida's Tedder standard is necessary
in order to ensure that the sentence imposed upon the defendant
155 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 1039 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'57 Id. at 1040 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens pointed out that 29 of the then 37 states
which allowed capital punishment had schemes where the jury made the sentencing deci-
sion on its own. Id. (StevensJ, dissenting). At the time this Note was written there were
38 states which had capital punishment statutes because New York recently adopted capital
punishment legislation. See Stephen B. Bright & PatrickJ. Keenan,Judges and the Politics of
Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 73 B.U. L. REv.
759, 835 n.88 (1995). The New York capital sentencing scheme dictates that the jury
makes the sentencing decision. N.Y. CrIM. PROc. LAw § 400.27 (McKinney 1995). Thus,
30 of 38 states currently have capital sentencing schemes in which the jury makes the ulti-
mate determination of the sentence. The 38 states which have capital punishment statutes
are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. See Bright & Keenan supra.
160 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1040 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 1041 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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actually reflects the sentiments of the community.163 "A penalty that
fails to reflect the community's judgment that death is the appropri-
ate sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under our rea-
soning. . . ."16 And, this reasoning applied in the present case
suggests that "[t]o permit the state to execute a woman in spite of the
community's considered judgment that she should not die is to sever
the death penalty from its only legitimate mooring."165
As a result, Justice Stevens argued, the Tedderstandard is constitu-
tionally mandated.' 66 Justice Stevens cited several cases where the
Court had approved the Tedder standard, and concluded that the way
in which the jury is involved in the Florida sentencing scheme ensures
that the community's voice is heard in the sentencing decision.' 67 Jus-
tice Stevens asserted, "[A] penalty that fails to reflect the community's
judgment that death is an appropriate sentence constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment."' 68 Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that
the Tedder standard must be a constitutional imperative.' 69
V. ANALYSiS
Despite the Court's correct assertion that the Tedder standard is
not constitutionally mandated, the Court was incorrect in holding that
Alabama's sentencing scheme does not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment,170 and, according to Furman v. Georgia, it re-
quires that sentences not be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously.17' Al-
abama's sentencing scheme violates the Furman mandates by giving
unbridled discretion to the sentencing judge. This Section begins
with a discussion of the constitutional imperatives imposed on legisla-
tures by the Eighth Amendment in enacting their sentencing
schemes. Next, the Note examines the effects the Alabama sentenc-
ing scheme has on the sentences of convicted defendants in Alabama.
The Note then explores judicial bias in sentencing and the political
pressures judges face in making sentencing decisions. Finally, the
Note examines Justice O'Connor's reasoning and explores its
163 Id. at 1042 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
164 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 1042-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 1042 (StevensJ, dissenting).
167 Id. (Stevens, J, dissenting). See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465 (1984);
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294-95 (1977); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252
(1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JU-).
168 Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1042 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
169 Id. (Stevens, J, dissenting).
170 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.




A. THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Constitution protects against the imposition of cruel and un-
usual punishment. 172 Before Furman, the Court had stated, "Punish-
ments are cruel when they involve torture or lingering death....
[Cruel] implies there is something inhuman and barbarous-some-
thing more than the mere extinguishment of life."'17 The Supreme
Court, in Furman, expanded the definition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment to include sentencing schemes which result in the arbitrary
and capricious imposition of sentences. 174 That is, the reach of the
Eighth Amendment was expanded to cover entire sentencing schemes
rather than just individual sentences. Whereas before Furman, only a
punishment that was deemed "barbaric" or similarly disdainful would
be violative of the Eighth Amendment, now "[i]t would seem incon-
testable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is 'unusual'
if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth,
social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that
gives room for the play of such prejudices. "175 In addition, "it is 'cruel
and unusual' to apply the death penalty-or any other penalty-selec-
tively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts, and who
are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though it
would not countenance general application of the same penalty across
the board."176 Thus in Furman, the Court held that any imposition of
a punishment in an arbitrary or capricious manner is unconstitu-
tional. 177 AsJustice Stewart stated, "the Eighth... Amendmen[t] can-
172 U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
173 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). For additional historical perspectives on
the Eighth Amendment and the definition of "cruel and unusual," see also Furman, 408
U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); Furman, 408 U.S. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
A view similar to that expressed in Kemmler is held by Justice Scalia. Scalia stated that the
Eighth Amendment: (1) only prohibits cruel and unusual punishment; (2) "does not, by
its terms, regulate the procedures of sentencing as opposed to the substance of punish-
ment; and (3) only applies to sentencing schemes when they "are of such a nature as
systematically to render the infliction of a cruel punishment 'unusual.'" Walton v. Arizona,
497 U.S. 639, 670 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
174 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (Stewart, J., concurring).
175 Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring).
177 See id at 310 (StewartJ,. concurring). In fact, two Justices concluded that the death
penalty itself was cruel and unusual punishment, and thus any capital punishment scheme
was unconstitutional on its face. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring);
Furman, 408 U.S. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also jones v. Alabama, cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1062, 1063 (1985) (Marshall,J, dissenting). justice Brennan joinedJustice Mar-
shall's dissent in the denial of certiorari, stating- "I continue to adhere to my view that the
death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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not tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems
that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly
imposed."178
Moreover, the Court has concluded that sentencing schemes that
contain improper guidance to the sentencer violate the Eighth
Amendment. 79 Specifically, any punishment imposed on a "whim,
passion, [or] prejudice" violates the Eighth Amendment. 80 The un-
derlying purpose of the Eighth Amendment is to ensure that the
states' power to inflict punishments is "exercised within the limits of
civilized standards."' 8 ' The punishments resulting from such schemes
are deemed cruel and unusual because they are by nature arbitrary
and discriminatory. 8 2 Any time extrinsic factors are able to enter a
sentencing decision, and any time proper guidance is not given to the
sentencer, there is a greater chance that an arbitrary sentence will re-
sult by virtue of the fact that the sentencer has too much leeway. This
is the case with Alabama's sentencing scheme.
In Alabama, where the judge is not given any guidance as to how
much weight to accord the jury's recommendation, the exact "arbi-
trariness and capriciousness" which the Court sought to prevent in
Furman can come into play.'83 "[T]he death penalty's cruel and unu-
sual nature is made all the more arbitrary and freakish when it is im-
posed by a judge in the face of ajury determination that death is an
appropriate punishment." 8 4
A system like Florida's, where the judge is told to give the jury's
recommendation "great weight" and not to reject the jury's recom-
mendation unless the evidence in favor of a death sentence is "so clear
and convincing that no reasonable person could differ"18 5 prohibits
arbitrariness. A Florida judge is accountable for his decision in a way
an Alabamajudge is not, thus guaranteeing a less arbitrary sentence in
Florida. "It approaches the most literal sense of the word 'arbitrary' to
put one to death in the face of a contrary jury determination where it
is accepted that the jury had indeed responsibly carried out its
task."' 8
6
178 Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J,. concurring).
179 See id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
180 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
181 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion).
182 Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
183 See infra part V.C.1 for an in-depth discussion of the effects of racial bias of sentenc-
ing; see infra part V.C.2 for a discussion of the effects that political pressures placed on
judges can have on sentencing.
184 Jones v. Alabama, cer. denied, 470 U.S. 1062 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185 Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (1975).
186 Jones, cert. denied, 470 U.S. at 1065 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Although it may be argued that if the Arizona, Idaho, Montana,
and Nebraska capital sentencing statutes have not been declared un-
constitutional-and therefore are not cruel and unusual-despite the
fact that they vest complete sentencing discretion in the judge, then a
capital sentencing scheme which involves the jury as one of its compo-
nents but vests ultimate decision-making power in the judge must be
constitutional as well. Such an argument is not persuasive, however.
The Court has not declared that any specific scheme must be
adopted, merely that the sentencing ultimately resulting from the
scheme must not be arbitrary and capricious. Thus, a scheme
whereby the judge has sole authority, provided it gives judges gui-
dance and limits their discretion, may very well be constitutional.
There is a big difference between a system where guidance is given
and one in which it is not-no matter who makes the final sentencing
decision. 187
Therefore, the ultimate question is not who has the power but
how that power is controlled. 188 Guidance must be given to the jury
even in states where the jury makes the sentencing decision. 189 In the
states where complete sentencing power is relegated to the judge, the
judge is told which aggravating and mitigating factors to consider and
the weight to accord them. °90 Capital sentencing schemes must in-
clude the factors to be weighed and the weight they should be given,
no matter who is making that decision. Unless each factor is neatly
laid out and the weight to be accorded is detailed, the sentences re-
sulting from it will necessarily be arbitrary since any sentencing body
can use the factor as it chooses. This is the ultimate problem with
Alabama's scheme: it requires a judge to consider the jury's recom-
mendation without providing any guidance as to how much weight to
give it. The real issue is not whether the judge or the jury is making
187 See Jones, cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062 (MarshallJ., dissenting). In his dissent from the
Court's denial of certiorari, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, stated, "[Ala-
bama's sentencing] system is quite different from a system where there is no jury, for here
there has been a life sentence determination by a properly selected and instructed jury
which has been witness to all the evidence and arguments. Where such determination has
been made, it must at least account for something." Id. at 1064 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
188 In fact, a capital sentencing scheme in which the jury was simply instructed to sen-
tence the defendant without providing any guidance as to the process the jury should use
to formulate the sentence might be just as likely to result in arbitrary and capricious
sentences as one where the judge was given such power.
189 For instance, under the sentencing scheme in Texas, where the jury makes the com-
plete sentencing decision, the jury bases its sentencing decision on three determinations:
the likelihood that the defendant will be dangerous in the future; whether the defendant
intended to kill the victim or the defendant's level of responsibility for the victim's death;
and whether there were any mitigating circumstances which would warrant a life sentence.
TEx. GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2) (West Supp. 1995).
190 See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F), (G) (Supp. 1993).
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the ultimate sentencing decision but rather whether the scheme is so
nebulous as to result in arbitrary and capricious sentences.
B. THE EFFECTS OF THE ALABAMA SENTENCING SCHEME
In twenty-nine of the thirty-seven states (seventy-eight percent)
which permit capital punishment, the jury makes the final determina-
tion of the defendant's sentence. 191 The handful of other states
which allow capital punishment allow the judge to play a role. As is
discussed in more detail in part II.C., four states have capital sentenc-
ing procedures wherein the judge makes the sole determination of
the defendant's sentence, and the other four states, including Ala-
bama, have schemes which require the judge to consider the jury's
recommended sentence.' 92 Clearly, in most states the greatest em-
phasis is placed on the jury's involvement in capital sentencing. The
fact that judges may have ulterior motives in imposing sentences on
defendants193 may be reflected in the statutory sentencing schemes of
these states.
In Alabama, the weight which judges accord jury recommenda-
tions varies greatly from judge to judge. 194 Some judges treat a life
recommendation as a mitigating factor whereas others give great
weight to jury recommendations. 195 Not only does the amount of
weight accorded the jury's recommendation vary from judge to judge,
but the weight that one judge accords it varies from case to case.1 9
6
Moreover, in practice, where no guidance is given to sentencing
judges regarding the amount of weight to accord to jury verdicts, the
judges need not give the recommendation any weight at all. 197 That
is,judges can never be held accountable for not giving enough Weight
to the jury recommendations. 198 And, there are many cases in Ala-
191 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1038 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Now 30 of
the 38 states, 77%, have sentencing schemes in which the jury makes the ultimate sentenc-
ing decision. See supra note 159 for a further discussion of the other states' statutes.
192 Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1038 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193 For instance, in Alabama, the trial judges who make the sentencing decisions face
partisan elections every six years. ALA. CODE § 17-2-7 (1987).
194 See Petitioner's Brief at 19-20, Harris (No. 93-7659).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 20. Judge Randall Thomas, who sentenced Harris and one of her co-defend-
ants, stated that he "considered" the jury's life recommendation in Harris's case. Id. He
made a similar statement in Sockwell's sentencing order. State v. Sockwell, No. CC-88-
1244-HR (Montgomery County 1991). However, in another case where he overrode the
jury's life recommendation, he said he accorded thejury's advisory sentence "great weight"
and was treating it as a mitigating factor. State v. Coral, No. CC-88-741 (Montgomery
County 1992).
197 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1038 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198 Of course, judges are held accountable for their sentencing decisions at election
time, but voters typically do not pore over judges' decisions and opinions when deciding,
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bama in which it appears the judges gave little or no weight to the jury
recommendation. 199 Of thirty-three cases where the judge overrode
the jury's life sentence recommendation and sentenced the defendant
to death, nineteen (fifty-eight percent) involved jury vote tallies where
more than two-thirds of the jurors had voted for life imprisonment. 200
In fact, in four of the cases, the juries had unanimously voted for life
imprisonment.20'
Alabama sentencing judges not only failed to give consistent
weight to jury recommendations, they often failed to specify the rea-
soning behind their decisions in cases where they overrode the jury
recommendations. 20 2 There were thirty-six jury overrides in Alabama
between 1981 and 1991, and in nineteen of those cases "the trial court
stated little more than that its independent examination found aggra-
vating circumstances to exceed mitigating ones."203
The trial judge in Harris seemingly gave little or no regard to the
jury's recommendation of life imprisonment,204 making only a cursory
mention of the jury's recommendation and then rejecting it.205 The
judge sentenced Harris to death without any explanation as to why or
as to what role he allowed the jury recommendation to play in his
sentencing decision other than to say that he "considered" it.
20 6
The manner in which judges have treated jury sentence recom-
mendations provides no discernible pattern. 20 7 The amount of weight
accorded to the advisory sentences varies from one judge to another
as well as from one case to another.20 8 This type of random, arbitrary
sentencing mechanism is exactly the type of sentencing scheme which
Furman and the Eighth Amendment seek to prevent.
C. THE REALITIES OF SENTENCING
Who makes the ultimate sentencing decision-the judge or the
jury-and how much weight that decision-maker gives to the other's
recommendation is something that can be controlled both statutorily
and through common law mandates like the Tedder standard. Unfor-
tunately, there are many other factors affecting sentencing over which
how to cast their votes.
199 Russell, supra note 28, at 33-34.
200 Russell, supra note 28, at 33-34.
201 Russell, supra note 28, at 33-34.
202 Russell, supra note 28, at 29.
203 Russell, supra note 28, at 29.







judges and the legislature have little control. These factors include
judicial bias based on race 20 9 and the political pressures that are
placed on judges to be tough on crime.210 Given the fact that there is
no easy way to control these factors and the fact that the Court wants
to prevent arbitrary and capricious sentences, the Court should re-
quire sentencing schemes to provide greater guidance to the ultimate
sentence-imposer. Such guidance will limit the potential effects of ex-
trinsic factors by channeling the sentencer's decision.
1. Judicial Bias in Sentencing
Studies have shown that judicial bias has an effect on sentencing
decisions.211 However, the Court has rejected the use of statistical
methods for proving constitutional violations in individual sentencing
decisions when the statistics address broader discriminatory prac-
tices.212 The Court was confronted with the issue of judicial bias in
sentencing in McCleskey v. Kemp.213 In McCleskey, the petitioner, an Af-
rican-American man, sought to prove racial bias in his own sentencing
by offering a study which showed racial bias in sentencing in gen-
eral.214 The Court allowed the evidence to be admitted but upheld
the death sentence, in a five to four decision, reasoning that the peti-
tioner failed to prove that there had been racial animus in his specific
case.215 The Court declared that the statistics were insufficient to
demonstrate that there was an "unacceptable risk of racial prejudice
influencing [the] capital sentencing decisio[n]."216 The four dissent-
ers,21 7 considering the statistics regarding racial bias in sentencing in
Georgia, disagreed and concluded that, in fact, there was an imper-
209 See, e.g., Samuel R. Cross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Vzctimization, 37 STAN. L. REv. 27 (1984).
210 See, e.g., Politics and the Death Penalty, 21 HUM. RTs. 24, 29 (1994).
211 See, e.g., DAVID C, BALDUs r AL., EQUALJUSTICE ANr THE DEATH PENALTY, 80-139, 198-
228, 306-425 (1990); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Com-
promises Upon Which They Rest 17 HoFsrRA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1988); Cross & Mauro, supra note
209. The Baldus study was based on over 2,000 Georgia murder cases, and it examined
data relating to the defendant's race, the victim's race, and the various combinations re-
sulting therefrom. The study indicated that black defendants who killed white victims were
the most likely to receive the death penalty. For a critique of the Baldus study see Howe,
supra note 24 (describing the importance of the Badus study and questioning the authors'
contention that equality in capital punishment on a statistically significant level is the goal
of the Constitution).
212 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 290 (1987).
213 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
214 Id. at 287.
215 Id. at 292 (where the Court declared that in order to prevail, the defendant would
have had to provide specific concrete evidence in his own case, not just cite to statistics).
216 Id. at 309.
217 Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined injustice Brennan's dissent.
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missible risk that racial considerations had motivated the petitioner's
sentencing.
218
Judicial bias based on race exists in sentencing.219 Justices Doug-
las,220 Brennan, 221 and Marshall 222 recognized this in their concur-
rences in the landmark Furman decision. As Justice Douglas stated,
[W] e know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the
death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding
prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking
political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority,
and saving those who by social position may be in a more protected
position.
223
Although the Court has acted to prevent racial bias in other aspects of
the trial process, 224 controlling judicial bias in sentencing is difficult.
Since judges do not express racial bias when issuing their sentencing
orders, the only way a defendant can prove such bias is through statis-
tical methods, like those rejected in McCleskey.225
The seriousness of the problem of racial bias has been recognized
both by the Court and by Congress.226 In addition to noting the fact
that racial bias pervades sentencing, Justice Brennan noted the rea-
sons why such bias is so egregious:
Considering the race of a defendant or victim in deciding if the death
penalty should be imposed is completely at odds with this concern that
an individual be evaluated as a unique human being. Decisions influ-
enced by race rest in part on a categorical assessment of the worth of
human beings according to color, insensitive to whatever qualities the
individuals in question may possess. Enhanced willingness to impose the
death sentence on black defendants, or diminished willingness to render
such a sentence when blacks are victims, reflects a devaluation of the
lives of black persons. When confronted with evidence that race more
likely than not plays such a role in a capital-sentencing system, it is
218 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 325-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
219 See Bryan K. Fair, Using Parrots to Kill Mockingbirds: Yet Another Racial Prosecution and
Wrongful Conviction in Maycomb, 45 ALA. L. REV. 403 (Winter 1994) for an in-depth look at
and specific examples of racial animus in sentencing.
220 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 253 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
221 Id. at 293-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
222 Id. at 364-66, 368 (Marshall, J., concurring).
223 Id. at 255 (Douglas,J., concurring). Justice Douglas further concluded that the "dis-
cretionary [capital sentencing) statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are
pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the
idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual'
punishments." Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
224 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), where the Court declared
that it was unconstitutional to exclude African-Americans from juries. Id. at 304. See also
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 302 (1965), where the Court reiterated the principles from
Strauder. Id. at 204.
225 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1987).
226 Id. at 334-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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plainly insufficient to say that the importance of discretion demands that
the risk be higher before we will act-for in such a case the very end that
discretion is designed to serve is being undermined.2 27
Congress also recognized the problems with racial disparities in
sentencing.2 28 Congress established the United States Sentencing
Commission which promulgated the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
in part to eliminate racial disparities in sentencing.229 The Guidelines
attempt to do this by eliminating much of the federal judges' discre-
tion in sentencing and replacing it with minimum sentences for cer-
tain offenses.2
3 0
The influence of racial bias in sentencing should be closely moni-
tored. Since the Court has rejected statistics as a method for proving
discrimination in specific cases, the only other recourse is to control
the power of the final sentencing body, whether it is the judge or the
jury, by placing strict limits on its discretion, just like the sentencing
guidelines attempt to do. In this way, personal feelings will be ham-
pered from entering into sentencing decisions. Thus, in order to pre-
vent racial bias in Alabama sentencing, the Court should have struck
down the Alabama sentencing scheme as unconstitutional because it
falls to give enough guidance to the judge. This, in turn, would have
forced Alabama to revise its sentencing scheme so as to comply with
the Court's decision.
2. Political Pressures on Judges
Alabama judges are elected every six years.2 31 Thus, judges are
subject to the same political pressures other elected officials face, and
the electorate will analyze judges' judgments and sentences in the
same way in which they analyze politicians' decisions in the legislature.
The judges' decisions, therefore, greatly impact whether they are re-
elected, and the public is strongly in favor of meting out the maxi-
mum punishments to defendants.2
3 2
According to Bryan Stevenson, the Executive Director of the Ala-
bama Capital Representation Resource Center, "When you do a statis-
tical study--a minimultiple regression analysis of how the death
penalty is applied and how override is applied-there is a statistically
227 Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228 Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of the Jury System on the Status of African-
American Males: An Overview Perspective, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 23, 39 (1994).
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 ALA. CODE § 17-2-7 (1987). In fact, in nine states, including Alabama and Texas,
judges actually run under party affiliations, furthering the chance that politics will influ-
ence their sentencing decisions. Bright & Keenan, supra note 159, at 779.
232 For a more in-depth discussion of this subject, see Bright & Keenan, supra note 159.
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significant correlation between judicial override and election
years."233
Further evidence indicating that political pressures do affect
judges was provided by a North Carolina judge. During a recent
American Bar Association panel discussion, ChiefJustice Exum, of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, discussed his campaign for Chief
Justice, demonstrating the pressures he felt to support and impose the
death penalty:
23 4
Sometimes the campaign debate got really grizzly. My opponents would
bring up all the times I had dissented in cases involving the imposition
of the death penalty, and I had to come back and demonstrate all the
times I had concurred in cases sustaining the death penalty. So, it
emerged into a battle of statistics.
235
ChiefJustice Exum continued, "So, I guess on the question of whether
elected state judges can survive if they sometimes overturn death
sentences, the answer is yes, they can, but I believe that it is becoming
more and more difficult. '236
Another example of the political influences judges face arose in
Alabama. There, a Court of Criminal Appeals judge who was running
for a position on the Alabama Supreme Court accused the Alabama
Supreme Court of being "'too left and too liberal' in capital cases and
challenged the court to set execution dates in twenty-seven cases that
were pending in the federal courts on habeas corpus review."23 7
Other judges actually have scheduled capital cases so that they occur
right before elections,238 and still other judges have refused to con-
tinue a case until after an election just so they can get the publicity
which surrounds such trials.23 9
These examples provide concrete evidence that the amount of
political pressure on judges is enormous. These pressures inevitably
233 Politics and theDeath Penalty, 21 HUM. RTs. 24, 25 (1994). This article is a collection of
statements made at a panel discussion at a 1993 meeting of the American Bar Association.
See Stevenson's discussion in Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due
Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure, 21 FoRDaA URB. L.J. 239 (1994) for a complete
discussion.
234 Politics and the Death Penalty, supra note 233, at 270.
235 Id. at 271.
236 Id. at 272.
237 Bright & Keenan, supra note 159, at 786.
238 Id. at 795-96.
239 Id. at 787-89. For instance, in Alabama, the defense in a capital case requested a
continuance because the defense attorney was suffering from a serious infection that was a
complication of polio. Bob Austin, who was a candidate in the election for the circuit
court of Alabama, was the judge in the case. He refused a motion by the defense to con-
tinue the case. The case was tried, and the defendant was sentenced to death. Full press
coverage was given to the case. This case occurred just two weeks before the election,
which Austin proceeded to win. Id.
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impact judges' sentencing decisions. The Alabama sentencing
scheme does nothing to temper these pressures, it simply increases
the arbitrariness of the sentences imposed by Alabama judges.
Therefore, in order to comply with the Furman mandate of non-arbi-
trary, non-capricious sentences, without eliminating the procedure of
electing state court judges, guidelines should be given to sentencers.
As more limitations are placed on judges' discretion so that they can-
not act on whims or prejudices, it becomes more likely that the
sentences will not be arbitrary.
D. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S "NO COURT LEGISLATION" ARGUMENT
Since the Furman decision in 1972, the Court has consistently
stated that the death penalty is an extreme form of punishment that
should only be used in dire circumstances. 240 Thus, the states are re-
quired to "regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for
imposing a sentence of death,"241 and they must rectify the "proce-
dural rules that tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing
determination."242 The most significant and fundamental point of all
of these pronouncements was that "death penalty statutes must be
structured so as to prevent the penalty from being administered in an
arbitrary and unpredictable fashion."
243
The majority acknowledged such pronouncements in Harris but
failed to give much credence to them. Instead, Justice O'Connor, by
citing various political and judicial tenets about the balance of power
and the role of precedent, avoided fully delving into the issue
presented in Harris: namely, whether the Alabama capital sentencing
scheme resulted in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of
sentences. 244 Justice O'Connor never explained why the sentences re-
sulting from Alabama's capital sentencing scheme are not arbitrary.
She simply dismissed the statistics about the number ofjudicial over-
rides in favor of the death penalty, stating that they do not demon-
strate anything about constitutionality.245 Thus, Justice O'Connor
concluded, the Court did not have the power to force Alabama to
adopt Florida's Tedder standard.246
Justice O'Connor made several statements regarding the limited
role that precedent plays in terms of the substance of the sentencing
240 Cf Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1037-39 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion).
242 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980).
243 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
244 Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1032.
245 See id at 1036.
246 Id. at 1035.
1996] 1435
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
schemes. For example, she wrote:
These statements of approbation [about the Tedder standard], do not
mean that the Tedder standard is constitutionally required.... [O]ur
praise for Tedder notwithstanding, the hallmark of the analysis is not the
particular weight a State chooses to place upon the jury's advice, but
whether the scheme adequately channels the sentencer's discretion so as
to prevent arbitrary results.24 7
Justice O'Connor also quoted Franklin v. Lynaugh248 where the Court
stated that no "specific method for balancing mitigating and aggravat-
ing factors in a capital sentencing proceeding is constitutionally
required."
249
As support for the proposition that the Florida precedents should
play a very limited role, the Court discussed the fact that it is not the
role of the Court to legislate.2 50 Although these statements may be
accurate interpretations of the role of the judiciary, they do not lead
to the conclusion that the Alabama capital sentencing scheme is
constitutional.
The Court's reasoning is flawed. In effect, the Court is saying
that because it is not within its power to determine what the Alabama
scheme must say, it is also not within its power to simply declare the
scheme unconstitutional. Such a statement overlooks the basic fact
that the Court does not have to design replacement statutes for those
statutes it declares unconstitutional.2 51 Instead, the Court should
have declared Alabama's capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional
under Furman and let the Alabama legislature adopt a new scheme-
one which would not result in arbitrary sentences.
The majority opinion, therefore, managed to avoid an in-depth
analysis of the realities of sentencing and the arbitrariness that actu-
ally does pervade the sentencing process both in Alabama and
elsewhere.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Amendment protects against arbitrary and capricious
sentencing schemes. In order to protect against the whims and
prejudices which can affect sentencing, the Constitution requires that
sentencing schemes give proper guidance to sentencers. Such restric-
247 Id.
248 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
249 Id. at 179.
250 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1035 (1995).
251 This reality can be seen in innumerable cases, including United States v. Furman,
discussed supra note 29, where the Court declared all then-existing death penalty statutes
unconstitutional. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). As a result, each state
had to revamp its current statute or create a new one.
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tions on sentencers' discretion prevents arbitrary sentences.
Factors like judicial bias and the political pressures faced by
judges inevitably have an impact on judges and the sentences they
impose. 252 These factors introduce an inevitable arbitrariness into
sentencing. Because such factors are not easily monitored or con-
trolled, sentencing schemes must do their best to ensure that such
factors have little impact on sentencing decisions. That is, they must
incorporate restrictions on the judge's discretion so as to eliminate as
much arbitrariness as possible.
The Alabama sentencing scheme at issue in Harris v. Alabama fails
to incorporate the proper guidelines and channeling devices which
prevent arbitrary sentencing. Although the scheme does contain
some specifications to the judge on how to formulate a sentence, it
does not instruct the judge on how to treat the jury's recommended
sentence. Thus, the resulting sentences contain the exact arbitrari-
ness that Furman sought to prevent, and the scheme violates the
Eighth Amendment and its protection against cruel and unusual
punishment.
The Tedder standard employed in Florida acts as a safeguard
against judicial whims and prejudices. The Florida scheme instructs
the judge on how to factor in each aspect of the scheme-including
how much weight to accord the jury's recommended sentence.
Although the Tedder standard, as noted by Justice O'Connor, was
never declared a constitutional mandate, the Court could have de-
clared Alabama's sentencing scheme unconstitutional without requir-
ing Alabama to adopt, the Tedder standard. Such a decision is clearly
within the bounds of the Court's powers. If the Court declared the
sentencing scheme unconstitutional, the Alabama legislature would
have to revise it, and the legislature would be forced to enact a new
scheme which comports with the mandates set forth in Furman:
namely, a sentencing scheme which restricts the judge's discretion to
such an extent that arbitrary and capricious sentences are avoided.
KARIN E. GARVFY
252 See Politics and the Death Penalty, supra note 233. James A. Coleman,Jr., a professor at
Duke University stated, "you [have] to accept the risk that some arbitrary factor [will] de-
termine impositions of the death penalty." Id. at 24.
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